Failure of the Republican form of government in China, 1911-1916

Summary

YUAN SHIKAI AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC

i. Yuan Shih-k'ai's dictatorial policies - Once in power, Yuan took measures to strengthen his position against the T'ung-meng hui members. He put his own followers and supporters in important government posts of the Republic. Some T'ung-meng hui members were forced to resign by Yuan. Outwardly, however Yuan still showed great respect to Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing.

ii. Formation of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the assassination of Sung Chiao-jen  - In late 1912, to check Yuan's power by constitutional ways, the T'ung-meng hui absorbed four other lesser parties to form the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), under the guidance of Sung Chiao-jen. Another party, the Chin-pu tang (Progressive Party), supported Yuan. But the Kuomintang was stronger by far. However, in 1913, Sung Chiao-jen was assassinated. It was believed that Yuan was responsible for this.

iii. The Second Revolution, 1913 - Then, to strengthen his rule against the revolutionaries, Yuan negotiated a "reorganization loan" from the Five Power Banking Consortium without parliament's approval. When the Kuomintang members accused Yuan, Yuan dismissed some Kuomintang governors in the south. In such conditions, the Kuomintang men started the so-called 'Second Revolution' against Yuan's dictatorship: Within a few months, however, the revolutionaries were easily defeated by Yuan's armies. The Kuomintang was itself banned as a political party.

iv. Reasons for the failure of the Second Revolution:-
a. The revolutionaries led by the Kuomintang were divided among themselves. The revolution was badly planned. Money was lacking.
b. Yuan's armies were superior, both in numbers and in arms.
c. British help was given to Yuan in the form of loans and weapons.
d. The Chinese people, especially the peasants, knew little about city politics, did not understand why the revolutionaries fought with Yuan, were tired of further political disorder, and gave no support to the Kuomintang.
e. The local-provincial gentry wished to protect their own interests and were not sympathetic toward the revolutionaries.

v. In 1914, Yuan Shih-k'ai ordered the creation of a Constitutional Compact that practically turned his rule into a dictatorship. The President's term of office was extended to 10 years and was renewable by reelection. Moreover, Yuan had the power to decide who was to succeed him.

i. Weak control over the provinces -  From 1912 to 1913, Yuan had only little control over the decentralized provinces.
a. He lacked the power to appoint important officials in most provinces.
b. Peking failed to collect all the taxes in the provinces. Yuan received no more than 5% of all provincial taxes.
c. Provincial officials by-passed the Central government and dealt directly with foreigners in matters like provincial economic development. Some provinces even issued paper money with no guarantee of value.

ii. Attempted centralization - During the suppression of the 1913 Second Revolution, Yuan was able to extend control over the lower Yangtze provinces. With such a rich base, Yuan then tried to centralize political power throughout the whole country:
a. Local-provincial taxes were to be brought more directly under Peking's control.
b. A national currency was to be established.
c. Representatives of the Central government were to be sent to provincial offices.
d. Civil and military duties were to be separated, a measure to destroy the political independence of regional military leaders.
e. Powers of provincial and local assemblies (creations of the late Ch'ing) were to be reduced.

iii. Failure at centralization - Despite these reforms, Yuan failed to crush the deep-rooted power of the decentralized provinces.

iv. Methods of control over the provinces - Yuan controlled the provinces only through:
a. His Peiyang Army.
b. Money borrowed from abroad to satisfy h is generals.
c. His connections and friendship with his generals.

C. Yuan Shih-k'ai and the attempt at restoration of a monarchy

i. Background
a. Yuan was not content to be just a president. He wanted to become the Emperor of China.
b. He underestimated the strength of the popular enthusiasm for republicanism and wrongly expected that conservative forces in China would welcome the return of an emperor.
c. Dr. Goodnow, Yuan's American adviser, believed that a constitutional monarchy was more suitable for China, where conservatism and tradition were, he said, especially strong. He argued that a monarchy would solve the problem of political succession (a problem that the Republic seemed to have), unify the country, and prevent foreign powers from intervening in Chinese politics. Yuan's Japanese advisers also emphasized constitutional monarchy as the source of national strength.
d. In 1915, it seemed that the opportunity for restoring a monarchy in China was good for Yuan. First, revolutionaries under the Kuomintang had been successfully suppressed. Secondly, the Western powers were busy at war in Europe, thus making it unlikely for them to intervene against the intended restoration. Thirdly, Japan seemed willing to support Yuan's attempt at becoming the emperor, in return for China's acceptance of the 21 Demands.

ii. Course 
a. Under Yuan's secret encouragement, a Peace Planning Society was founded in 1915 to promote the restoration movement. Requests that advocated a return to the monarchy were sent to the government. A national assembly was called, which approved the idea by a large majority.
b. In late 1915, Yuan, after some presence to be unwilling to accept the throne, took up the emperorship. He then decided that the next year, 1916,would be the beginning of his reign, known as the Glorious Constitution (Hung-hsien)

iii. Results - Opposition to Yuan's betrayal of the Republic emerged from all sides. Many of the provinces declared their independence from Yuan's government. When Yuan asked one of his generals to support him, the general simply asked him to resign. Only an illness and a natural death in mid-1916 saved Yuan from being expelled from power.

iv. Reasons for the failure of Yuan Shih-k'ai
a. The local-provincial gentry, eager to protect their own interests and independence, feared that a restored monarchy would carry out measures of centralization.
b. Yuan's military followers, who were to become warlords later, were not totally loyal to him; they made use of him to gain power just as he made use of them to strengthen his own support. Consequently, when Yuan tried to make himself emperor and threatened the interests of the military leaders, they no longer obeyed him.
c. The new, progressive intellectuals and reformers like Liang Ch'i-ch'ao distrusted Yuan and opposed the monarchical form of government.
d. The fact that Yuan was forced by Japan to accept the 21 Demands made him more unpopular in China.
e. Even Britain and Japan opposed the monarchical movement. While Japan was believed to have bribed Yuan's generals to oppose him, Britain denied Yuan the income from the British-controlled salt tax.
f.  Republicanism had been accepted in China, despite the political disorder it brought.

THE FAILURE OF THE REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN CHINA, 1911-1916

i. The revolutionaries believed that republicanism was the most advanced and modern form of government that would save China from internal backwardness and foreign exploitation.

ii. There was no other alternative, since monarchy was believed to be the very thing that blocked China's progress. 

iii. The political conditions of 1911 China called for the founding of a republic, for only under a republic could independent provincial interests be represented.

B. Reasons for the failure of republicanism

i. Harmful effects of Yuan Shih-k'ai's dictatorial policies - Yuan Shih-k'ai had no intention of working under and serving a republic. He ruled like a dictator, ignoring the constitution and using methods like bribery and murder. Even the Kuomintang men accepted bribes from Yuan. In effect, therefore, the Republic became a ground for selfish struggle for power among the opportunists. The ideals of republicanism were forgotten.

ii. China's lack of democratic tradition - China had no solid democratic tradition. There was, for example, a traditional dislike for political parties. Party activities were thought to be selfish and harmful to political harmony. Even the Western-educated revolutionaries hated the idea of open struggle for constitutional power. Sun Yat-sen, for example, failed to support Sung Chiao-jen for fear of being accused of being power-hungry. China had been traditionally used to the rule of men, not the rule of law.

 iii. Selfishness of local-provincial gentry and militarists - Political decentralization and the rise in power of the military leaders made really democratic government difficult to carry out. Local-provincial gentry and militarists were interested in keeping their own power in the provinces rather than in working for the creation of an efficient parliament in Peking. 

iv. Political inexperience and disunity of progressive forces - Liberals and intellectuals were divided and inexperienced in politics and lost every opportunity to check Yuan's dictatorship.

v. The parties' lack of popular support - Political parties like the Kuomintang were led by intellectuals who enjoyed little popular support. Consequently, party power was weak. Social conservatism was strong. Democracy had difficulty in taking root in China.

vi. Nationalism over democracy - To many Chinese nationalists, the most important national aim for China was the reunification and centralization of the whole country, not the establishment of a republic.

C. Effects of the Republic's failure

i. As will be seen, the failure of republicanism led to the warlords dominating China after 1916.

ii. The urgent need for social and economic reforms in China was neglected, as the Republic was weak, corrupt and divided. As a result, foreign control of China increased. Also, China's weakness invited Japanese aggression, like the presentation of the 21 Demands to Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1915. iii. Some Chinese intellectuals and liberals began to lose faith in republicanism as an effective way of saving China. They were prepared to turn to more advanced and radical ideas like Communism.

BACKGROUND OF THE WARLORD PERIOD

A. The influence of China's geography and history

Because different local regions had different geographical conditions and historical developments, China had in fact many local cultures.

B. The decline and fall of the Ch'ing dynasty

Traditional rulers held China together by two methods:
i. the government-organized Civil Service Examination, which centrally produced officials and scholar-gentry to administer the different areas of China,

ii. the government-sponsored ideology of Confucianism, which emphasized obedience to the dynasty in rule. Yet, by the early 20th century, these ways of political control were no longer workable. This was because:

- the Civil Service Examination was cancelled in 1905; 
- Confucianism as a political belief was on the decline; 
- the 1911 Revolution did away with the Ch'ing dynasty, thereby removing the traditional central structure that commanded the loyalty of government officials.

C. Political decentralization and the rise of regional military forces in late Ch'ing times

Political decentralization had been growing serious ever since the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64). Because of this factor, the control of the new armies created after 1895 fell into the hands of men like Yuan Shih-k'ai and other provincial military officers. After the successful 1911 revolution, these military men divided China into regions and became rulers, even though formally a republic ruled over the country.

D. The effects of late Ch'ing provincial and local self-rule

Such provincial and local self-rule enabled the scholar-gentry leaders to selfishly keep their provincial and local self-interests. These leaders indirectly resisted the Central government, whether the Ch'ing before 1911 or the Republic afterwards. All this favoured the rise of regional warlords.

E. The gradual disappearance of the traditional prejudice against the military profession

Traditionally, the military profession was despised in China. Around 1900, however, the situation changed gradually. A military career was gaining in popularity, for the following reasons:

i Foreign imperialism made it necessary for the development of militant patriotism and a martial spirit in China.

ii.  The late Ch'ing government had tried deliberately to raise the reputation and social position of military service.

iii. The abolition of the Civil Service Examination in 1905 made it impossible for youngsters to compete for the traditional civil professions. More young people entered the military service.

iv. In contrast to the corruption of Chinese armies in the past, the disciplined behaviour of the late Ch'ing new armies brought it a good reputation.

The Revolution of 1911 was quick but incomplete. The ruling classes of the late Ch'ing - military officers and local-provincial scholar-gentry -  remained in power. They became very powerful in local Chinese politics and divided China into parts. Lacking in reputation and real power, the new Republic failed to command the loyalty of all these ruling classes.

G. The death of Yuan Shih-k'ai, "father of the Chinese warlords" in 1916

From 1911 to 1916, the Peiyang Army, which Yuan created, was still unified and could therefore dominate other non-Peiyang provincial armies and local-provincial scholar-gentry. The commanders and officers of the Peiyang Army still obeyed Yuan's orders in general. But when Yuan died in 1916, these military men began to struggle for power and cut up territories themselves. This gave other non-Peiyang armies and scholar-gentry of the provinces a chance to gain more independence of action. When Yuan Shih-k'ai lived, some kind of unity still existed in China, for Yuan was still a national figure to stimulate a bit of nationalist feelings. After Yuan had gone, the country fell to pieces. The powerful warlords governed territories beyond the control of the powerless republican Central government in Peking. This was the period of the warlords.

THE WARLORDS

A warlord was a commander of a personal army, ruling a territory, and acting more or less independently. Some warlords controlled only a small district or two, but the most powerful warlords ruled over two or three provinces. Generally men of narrow vision and weak abilities, the warlords exploited the people to get rich. Once wealthy, they would give up their warlord positions, retire to the safety of the foreign concessions in the treaty-ports, and enjoy life with their ill-gotten money.

A. Within the warlord territories

i. Within his region, the warlord ruled like a dictator. It is true that some warlords carried out limited social reforms and even paid attention to national problems. But for the most part they governed with terror and exploited the people by all kinds of taxation and corruption.

ii. The warlord government lacked any ideology like Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People. Administration was carried out with violence and force. Thus armies were important and were continuously expanded. These warlord armies were trained to be personally loyal to the warlords alone. Yet in reality many of the warlord soldiers were unreliable, since most of them were jobless and hungry people who fought only for money. As a result, many of these soldiers changed sides or ran away in battle. this was the reason why soldiers had to be continually recruited. 

iii. The warlords often allowed their follower-commanders to rule some territories. This was because: a these officers expected rewards for their service, b the warlords could not personally control all their territorial belongings. With territorial control and the power of local taxation in hand, however, the officers became more and more independent and powerful. In the end, they became warlords themselves.

iv. Because of limited resources, the effective power of some warlords could only reach urban areas like towns and cities. Consequently, although in theory it was the warlord who occupied a province, in practice the scholar-gentry still ruled independently over the villages of the extensive countryside.

B. Between the warlords

i. For more territory and power, the warlords always fought with one another. Most of these wars were short-lived and small in scale. Alliances with other warlords were often made and changed. The most powerful warlords would become protectors of smaller warlords. But the internal governments of these smaller warlords were seldom interfered with, since military victories of one warlord over another were often short and limited.

ii. Because warlord armies were kept together by individual officers rather than a military system, the elimination of a single military commander by murder could greatly weaken a rival warlord's military strength. As a result, there were many political assassinations . Also, money and bribes (known as "silver bullets") were often offered to buy over the officers of a rival warlord.

C. In Peking the capital

i. While some warlords were content to struggle for territories among one another, other warlords were fond of fighting for the control of Peking, the capital. There were two reasons: 
a. On becoming the master of Peking, any warlord could represent the nation in foreign and internal matters, since the foreign powers only recognized the Peking government as China's formal government. The warlord in Peking could therefore acquire foreign loans in the name of the national government.

b After 1911, the foreign powers had taken over the complete control of the collection of China's customs and salt taxes in the treaty-ports. The collected money was then sent by foreigners from the treaty-ports to Peking to pay the interest on foreign loans that China had previously contracted. The remaining sum of money, even after deduction, was still large. It would be turned over to the Chinese government in Peking by the foreigners. In this way, whoever controlled Peking could obtain this large sum of money.

ii. Generally speaking, the northern warlords usually fought for the control of Peking in the name of national unification. The southern warlords, who had no hope of gaining control of the national capital, spoke strongly for a federal system of government (in which the provinces would retain important independent powers).

iii. Because of the struggle for Peking, China's national government changed hands quickly. From 1916 to 1928, China had more than 7 heads of state, another 7 brief periods of caretaker governments, and 25 cabinets in quick succession.

D. Relations with the foreign powers

i. To the foreign powers, the absence of a strong and centralized Chinese government during the warlord period offered opportunities for the expansion of economic concessions. On the other hand, however, warlord disorder made it unsafe for the foreign powers in enjoying their existing treaty-rights. There were, in short, both advantages and disadvantages.

ii. Japan was most eager to make use of China's political disunity. In 1917-18, large loans were sent to the Peking warlord government, in return for the extension of Japanese economic privileges in China. Other foreign powers also sent loans to the Peking warlords.

iii. Although there was an Arms Embargo Agreement in 1919 that prohibited the sale of arms and munitions to China, foreigners continued to sell weapons to. Chinese warlords for profits.

iv. Some foreign powers had the habit of choosing and supporting one or the other warlord in China. They hoped that if their warlord could one day unify China, they would make large gains. Russia, for example, backed Feng Yu-hsiang. Japan, on the other hand, supported Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria.

v. In short, the policies and activities of the foreigners during the warlord period encouraged China's political disunity.

GENERAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE WARLORD PERIOD

A. 1916-1923

From 1916 to 1918, there were, generally speaking, two groups of warlords in China. One consisted of Yuan Shih-k'ai's generals in North China; the other of militarists who had been uncooperative with Yuan in the south. Upon the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1916, the two groups fought with each other for territorial expansion, which continued till 1918. In that year, the northern group was itself divided into two: an "Anfu clique" and a "Chihli clique". The Anfu clique was led by Tuan Ch'i-jui, while the Chihli clique by Wu P'ei-fu. The two cliques often fought with each other for the control of Peking. Members of the two groups often changed sides. In 1920, Chang Tso-lin, who was a warlord backed by the Japanese in Manchuria, entered the struggle. Chang belonged to neither clique. He had his own ambitions.

B. 1924-1928

In 1924, the second round of warlord warfare began. Feng Yu-hsiang, who had previously been one of Wu P'ei-fu's generals, betrayed Wu and went over to the enemy's camp, the Anfu clique. Then, a struggle between Feng and Chang Tso-lin took place. In the end, Feng was defeated and had to retreat to Northwest China, where he got Russian backing. Meanwhile, in the south, warlords also fought for territories. Even Sun Yat-sen entered the struggle with warlords politically and militarily. 

EFFECTS OF THE WARLORD PERIOD

The warlord period had a harmful effect on the Chinese economy:

i. Agriculture - Frequent warlord warfare and disorder destroyed crops, plants and farms. Farm animals and tools were often seized by warlord soldiers, who behaved little better than bandits. On the other hand, although the production of opium had almost been stopped by 1916, the warlords revived it by giving large areas of land to opium-growth. This was because the business was profitable. Much land that could be used to produce food was therefore wasted.

ii. Trade — Because of the many and different local taxes imposed by the warlords, trade was restricted and was on the decline. Other factors also discouraged trade, such as the frequent dictatorial seizure of goods by warlord troops, the unjust handling of currency by the warlords (who printed as much paper money as they liked) and the military control of transport systems, which badly affected the free flow of goods.

iii. Industry—Industrialists and businessmen were often forced to make "donations" of money to the warlords. As the future was so uncertain, few industrialists and traders were willing to carry out any long-term economic project.

B. Social effects

i. The common people were seriously exploited by the warlord and his military men. Heavy taxes were imposed. In particular, the land tax rose 5 to 6 times. Many other taxes were introduced. There was, for example, even a" laziness tax" on those people who did not plant opium. Also, many taxes were collected in advance. In one region, they were collected up to the 56th year of the Republic, that is 1968! Other than taxes, services were also demanded from the people. For example, the peasants were required to provide carts and animals for warlord troops.

ii. Frequent wars between the warlords killed many people and created even more miseries in society. As the warlords paid little attention to constructive social reform, social problems remained as serious as they had been.

iii. In such unsafe social conditions, the peasants were forced to join secret societies for self-protection. This was the reason why when the Communists set up peasant associations in the early 1920s (see page 144), there was strong peasant support, with the result that these peasant associations were quickly growing in numbers. Warlord disorder thus indirectly contributed to the expansion OT Chinese Communism.

iv. Traditionally, members of the scholar-gentry class were social leaders in the villages, taking care of the peasants and commanding popular respect. In the warlord period, however, it seemed that the scholar gentry was either allied with or subservient to the warlords in jointly exploiting the people. Despairing of the scholar-gentry's social leadership, the peasants were as a result more prepared to accept and welcome the new social leadership offered by the Communists.

v. The social disorder that the warlords created led to the further breakdown of China's social tradition. First, human relationships were based less on moral bounds and more on expectations of reward and benefit. Secondly, social and geographic mobility increased: more people moved from lower social positions to higher ones or from one territory to another. Poor and illiterate peasants could become top military officers, even warlords.

C. Intellectual effects

i. Despite the lack of a unified government, nationalism continued to grow during the warlord period. There were two reasons:

a To look like national heroes, many warlords were fond of preaching nationalistic ideas. Slogans like "Destroy Imperialism" or "Save China" could often be heard.

b Political disunity that the warlords brought about aroused much dissatisfaction among Chinese intellectuals, who therefore stood out to save China in national movements like the May Fourth Movement.

ii. Because under the warlords there was no single national power with a single national ideology, these intellectuals had more freedom to experiment with different ideas and academic studies. It was under such an atmosphere of intellectual freedom that Communism, a new and strange body of belief, was introduced in China.

iii. Yet because both the Peking and warlord governments were corrupt and unstable, many able and ambitious young men were unwilling to make politics their career. Instead, these young people chose to bury themselves in impractical academic studies. Chinese intellectuals were thus further away from the common people and the peasants, whose suffering continued. In the end, it was Mao Tse-tung and the Communists who went to the countryside and started a revolution there.

i. The warlord period showed that a parliamentary republic on the Western model was a failure. Chinese intellectuals and liberals were therefore more willing to consider other systems of government, such as that of Communism.

ii. Political power, as the warlord period showed, was primarily based on the possession of strong military forces, not empty political ideas. In an atmosphere of power politics, both the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) and the KMT (Kuomintang) became more realistic and practical.

iii. The warlord period also raised the importance of the military profession in China. The leaders of both the CCP and the KMT were military men or men with extensive military experience.

iv. In the warlord period, political decentralization that began in late Ch'ing times was made worse. The problem of China's territorial and political breakup was unsolved. Even after 1928, when the KMT nominally unified the country, much Chinese territory was still governed by the former warlords. This obstructed the KMT's attempts at reform and thus weakened the KMT's power in fighting against the Communists.

v. Meanwhile, political disunity and warlord disorder invited more foreign imperialism. China became weaker, which encouraged Japanese aggression in the 1930s.

SUMMARY

From about the early 19th century onwards, the Ch'ing dynasty was on the decline, politically, economically and militarily. In particular, political-provincial decentralization had been growing serious since the mid-19th century. This, together with the coming of Western imperialism, quickened the downfall. To deal with such internal weakness and external threat, the Ch'ing government attempted reform movements which, however, proved to be failures.

Meanwhile, men like Sun Yat-sen were convinced that revolution, not reform, was what would really save China. He at first depended on the support of the overseas Chinese (hua-ch'iso) and secret societies. After repeated failures, however, he began appealing to foreign governments and overseas Chinese students. Although active foreign help was not obtained, overall revolutionary unity was better strengthened with the founding of the T'ungmenghui in 1905. However, factional rivalry soon grew in the T'ung-meng hui, and its organization remained small in size. Cooperative efforts in revolution were lacking. The revolutionary uprisings that were attempted were all failures.

The Wuhan Uprising on October 10, 1911 was an accidental success. It was not started by the T'ung-meng hui men. Because of either selfishness or anti-Manchu nationalism, many of the Ch'ing's modern armies did not come to the dynasty's help. The local-provincial gentry, who had been bitterly disappointed at the dynasty's insincere constitutional practice and the railway nationalization plan in 1910-11, just watched. Then, seeing the hopelessness of the dynasty, the gentry and militarists declared their provinces independent of Peking. Even Yuan Shih-k'ai, the most important militarist, abandoned the Ch'ing and accepted the presidency of the new Republic. Thus, contrary to the traditional view that the Wuhan revolution ''overthrew" the dynasty, it was in fact provincial declarations of independence that, strictly speaking, did so. The Wuhan revolution provided only a slight push, and the dynasty, rotten as it was, simply collapsed.

The 1911 Revolution brought down the dynasty but did not create a strong republic. Being a power-hungry militarist, Yuan Shih-k'ai had no faith in, nor any intention of practicing, democratic Republican rule. The gentry-merchant-militarist alliance at local levels resisted the Central government's control. As a minority group enjoying little social support, revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen had no political power to make Republicanism work. From 1912 to 1916, Yuan Shih-k'ai tried to crease a dictatorship and then to restore a monarchy. The attempt failed, because of local-provincial opposition, and the country broke up into semi-independent regions governed by selfish warlords and gentry. This led to rule by the warlords (1916-28). The men with military power made the decisions. The warlord period delayed China's modernization, increased social suffering, and worsened China's political disorder. All had the effect of encouraging Japanese aggression.

QUESTIONS

1. To what extent was the downfall of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911-12 due to the long-term decline in dynastic power?

2. To what extent did political problems that the Ch'ing government encountered in 1870-1911 bring about the fall of the dynasty in 1911 -12? 

3. In what ways did foreign imperialism contribute to the downfall of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911 -12?

4. How far should the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi be held responsible for the downfall of the Chting dynasty? 

5. How far were the social and economic problems in China in the early twentieth century conducive to the rise of revolutionary movements against the Ch'ing dynasty? 

6. Discuss the background that led up to the formation of the T'ung-meng hui (Revolutionary Alliance) in 1905. What role did the T'ung-meng hui play in the revolutionary movement from 1905 to 1911?

7. Describe the revolutionary programme of the T'ung-meng hui. Why did the intellectuals support the T'ung-meng hui? 

8. Describe the different policies that Sun Yat-sen employed in working for the revolutionary movement in China from 1895 to 1911. Discuss the success and failure of these policies.

9. Could it be said that the Ch'ing court angered many of its supporters from 1908 to 1911 ? How did these supporters react to the successful Wuhan revolution on October 10, 1911?

10. What do you understand by the phenomenon of political-provincial decentralization in late Ch'ing China? In what ways did this phenomenon contribute to the success of the 1911 revolution?

11. To what extent snould the dispute over railways between the Central government and the provinces be responsible for the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution in 1911 ? 

12. Describe the part played by Sun Yat-sen in the Chinese Revolution of 1911. Is it true that the importance of his part has been exaggerated? Give reasons.

13. Describe the influence of a. T'zu-hsi  b. Yuan Shih-k'ai    c . Sun Yat-sen on the 1911 - 12 Chinese Revolution.

14. Which of the following do you think played a more important part in bringing down the Ch'ing dynasty?
a. The Wuhan Revolution on October 10, 1911
b. The declarations of independence by the provinces in late 1911

15. What effects did the 1911 Revolution have on the history of China to 1928? In what ways could the revolution be said to be a success? In what ways could the revolution be said to be a failure?

16. "The establishment of the Republic did not lead to significant political or social changes in China." Comment on this statement and discuss China's national development in the early years of the Republic. 

17. Briefly describe important events of the early Republic in China from 1912 to 1916. Do you think Republicanism could effectively solve China's problems? What were these problems?

18. To what extent were the Three Principles of the People put into practice in the Republic under the presidency of Yuan Shih-K'ai? 

19. In what ways could Yuan Shih-k'ai be regarded as "father of the Chinese warlords"?

20. Briefly describe each of the following:
a. The Late Ch'ing military reform,1901-1910
b. The rise of warlords in China, 1916-1928. What were the connections between the two?

21. Discuss the factors responsible for the rise of modern Chinese nationalism. How did this force of Chinese nationalism contribute to the 1911 Revolution and the 1919 May Fourth Incident?